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THE FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE AMERICAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The mediation model of dispute settlement has long been
praised as an effective tool in facilitating an open exchange of information and an increased understanding between two parties who by
themselves may see little hope of compromise. However, the mediation model is not a panacea for resolving the world’s most difficult
and complex disputes. Despite the optimistic view of what mediation
can achieve, there are situations when it may be inappropriate and
even detrimental to the parties involved.
Within the United States, the use of mediation in the area of
family law has led observers to question how far the mediation model
can really go. Despite the affinity for alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms and frustration with the adversarial method, use of mediation in family law has meant that mediators are faced with situations involving domestic violence. The difficulty of such scenarios
has raised many questions; does the existence of violence in a relationship make the consensual model of mediation completely inappropriate? Can it realistically serve the interests of both parties when
there is fear, distrust, and an imbalance of power that a mediator may
not be able to counteract? In addition, should a model that “makes
deals” with a party who has committed criminal acts of cruelty be tolerated? Questions and concerns about the use of the mediation
model in situations of domestic violence are important in taking steps
that help identify the needs of victims and the goals which the system
is trying to attain in “resolving” these matters.
These issues are not only important to the domestic arena. Since
the close of the Second World War, similar situations have arisen on
an international level. In response to the atrocities committed by the
Nazi regime, the global community began to strengthen its resolve to
eradicate the occurrence of such grotesque violations of human
rights. The goal was to create an unwavering respect for the sanctity
of life and the dignity of individuals through international human
rights treaties, direct intervention, and prosecution. In addition, the
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international community began to use mediation to facilitate the
“friendly settlement” of disputes involving human rights violations.
This use of mediation to “settle” disputes raises many of the
same concerns regarding the rights of victims that arise in the domestic violence context. The horrific nature of the crimes involved raises
questions about the ability of such a model to encourage respect for
human rights, assign responsibility to abusers, and bring a sense of
justice to the victims. Is mediation in the context of gross human
rights abuses completely inappropriate or does it hold an important
value in the search for resolution and change?
This Note will analyze the propriety of the mediation model in
the framework of human rights abuses. Section II will describe the
practical and philosophical development of the friendly settlement
mechanism the manner in which it is specifically formulated under
the American Convention on Human Rights. Section III will then
utilize the framework of debate over the use of mediation in resolving situations of domestic violence within the United States in order
to evaluate the implications of the mediation mechanism in the arena
of human rights abuses. This discussion will lead to a more critical
look at the manner in which the world attempts to encourage respect
for the rule of law in nations torn by the devastation of cruelty and
torture. Perhaps mediation will become a tool of empowerment to
both victims and society as whole, but should we make deals with
those responsible for gross violations of human rights? Can mediation really provide both reconciliation and justice? Can it fulfill the
ideals of international human rights law?
II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF “FRIENDLY
SETTLEMENT” UNDER THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
The mechanism of “friendly settlement” has a long history in the
resolution of international disputes. Traditionally, this mechanism
has been referred to as “good offices,” which usually denotes a third
party becoming involved in an attempt to bring conflicting parties together without actually becoming involved in the negotiation itself.1
Although the use of this mechanism in the human rights arena has
not been without challenge,2 its use by international organizations3

1. B.G. Ramcharan, The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in the
Field of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 130, 131 (1982).
2. See id.
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has been extensive and its procedures have been integrated into some
of the most important international and regional human rights instruments:4 Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention of Human
Rights (American Convention)5 and Article 28(1)(b) of the European
Convention of Human Rights6 call for the “friendly settlement” of
complaints, and Article 41(1)(e) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights7 allows parties to utilize its “good offices.”
This Note will specifically focus on the friendly settlement
mechanism under the American Convention. This limitation of
scope will allow a more focused look at the mechanism’s strengths
and weaknesses under an institutional framework that is often asked
to resolve “disputes” involving allegations of gross violations of human rights such as torture, illegal arrest and detention, and forced
disappearance. The following analysis of the Inter-American system
can be applied to the use of friendly settlement throughout the arena
of international human rights law.
A. The Procedural Framework of the American Convention on
Human Rights
The American Convention on Human Rights establishes a system in which “any person or group of persons, or any non-

3. See id. at 132-33. Examples of international organizations that utilize their “g ood offices” with respect to human rights are the United Nations, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNCHR), the International Labor Organization (IGO), the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC).
4. See id. at 133.
5. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, OEA/ser.
K/XVI/1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1, art. 48(1)(f) (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights
in the Inter-American System, OAS/ser. L/VII.71, doc. 6, rev. 1 (1988). “The Commission shall
place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement
of the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognised in this Convention.” Id.
6. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention on Human Rights), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 28(1)(b), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 51 (Christopher Gane &
Mark Mackarel eds., 1997). “In the event of the Commission accepting a petition referred to it:
(b) it shall at the same time place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to
securing friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for Human Rights as defined
in the Convention.” Id.
7. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 41(1)(e). “. . . the Committee
shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly
solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as
recognized in the present Covenant.” Id.
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governmental entity . . . may lodge petitions . . . containing denunciations or complaints of violation of th[e] Convention by a State
Party.”8 Each petition filed is submitted to and reviewed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission).9 If the
Commission considers the petition admissible, it will then request information from the State concerned and, if necessary, conduct an investigation;10 more importantly, the Commission “shall place itself at
the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a
friendly settlement on the basis of respect for the human rights recognised in th[e] Convention.”11
If the parties involved reach a friendly settlement, the Commission will then submit for publication a report to the petitioner, the
States Parties to the Convention, and the Secretary General of the
Organization of American States.12 The report submitted will be
limited in content only to a “brief statement of the facts and of the
solution reached.”13 Once a friendly settlement is reached, the case is
considered closed.14
If a settlement is not reached within the time designated,15 the
Commission will “draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating
its conclusions”16 that will be transmitted to the States concerned
along with any proposals and recommendations made by the Commission.17 After the transmission of the report, the Parties concerned
have three months to come to an agreement before the Commission
issues its final opinion.18 Where appropriate, the Commission will
make recommendations and prescribe a time period within which the

8. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 44.
9. See id. arts. 44-48.
10. See id. art. 48(a)-(e).
11. Id. art. 48(1)(f).
12. See id. art. 49.
13. Id.
14. See Christina Cerna, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its Organization and Examination of Petitions and Communications, in INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 65, 100 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
15. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 45(5)
[hereinafter Regulations]. The Commission will fix a time for the conclusion of the friendly
settlement procedure on a case-by-case basis.
16. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 50(1).
17. See id. art. 50(2)-(3). It is important to note that at this stage the parties are not at liberty to publish the report. See id. art. 50(2). This provision was included in order to keep the
options for friendly settlement open as the procedures of the Commission continue forward.
18. See id. art. 51(1) (requiring an absolute majority of the Commission members).
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State should take remedial measures.19 The danger for the States
Party in this scenario is that if after the prescribed period the Commission believes that adequate measures have not been taken, it may
decide to publish its report.20
In summary, the Convention provides parties with two paths by
which they may avoid either the “recommendations” of the Commission or the eventual publication of a report, which in all probability,
will be disfavorable. The first is to reach a friendly settlement with
the complaining party before the expiration of the final thirty-day period.21 The second is to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (the Court).22 Therefore, the failure to reach
a friendly settlement creates an interesting dilemma for the State
Party accused of human rights abuses. If no agreement is reached, it
faces the possibility of mandated “recommendations,” publication of
a negative report, or an unfavorable ruling from the Court with which
they must comply.23
B. Practicing Friendly Settlement in the Americas
1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: The
Reluctance to Implement the Friendly Settlement Provision. The
Commission has not always looked favorably upon the friendly
settlement provision of the American Convention.24 Its early
disinclination to officially utilize its friendly settlement role has been
attributed to the fact that the Commission, which was established
twenty years prior to the Convention’s entry into force, has been
generally reluctant to adapt its procedures to the Convention’s
requirements.25 The gap between the two phases of the Commission’s
mandate arises from the fact that historically, the Commission’s role
was to investigate the occurrence of human rights violations that it
19. See id. art. 51(2).
20. See id. art. 51(3).
21. See id. art. 51(1).
22. See id. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established under Chapter
VIII of the American Convention in order to supplement the workings of the Commission. See
id. ch. VIII. However, unlike the Commission which can receive petitions from individuals and
non-state entities, the Court can only receive petitions from the Commission and States Parties.
See id. art. 61. If the Court does find that a State Party has violated a right protected by the
Convention, it shall order that the injured party’s rights be ensured, and if necessary that the
State give reparations. See id. art. 63.
23. See id. art. 68(1).
24. See Cerna, supra note 14, at 100.
25. See id. at 101.
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perceived not to be conducive to friendly settlement.26 On the other
hand, the Convention’s friendly settlement procedures were, written
using the quite different philosophy that human rights violations are,
in fact, capable of being resolved in a “friendly” manner.27
The Commission’s initial reluctance and concern with the propriety of its new role as mediator is demonstrated in the first case
that the Commission submitted to the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court.28 Velásquez Rodríguez was a seminal case in the history of
both the Inter-American System as a whole and the Inter-American
Court. For the Court, the case was of utmost importance, because it
was the first contentious case submitted to its jurisdiction. In addition, it was vital to the integrity of the system that all procedural rules
were correctly and strictly applied.29 The case was also groundbreaking in nature because of the contents of the allegations—it
would be the first binding decision on the status of the crime of
forced disappearance under the American Convention on Human
Rights.30
The factual background of Velásquez Rodríguez can further explain the severity of the substantive issues at stake. According to the
petition filed with the Commission, on September 12, 1981 Angel
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, a student at the National Autonomous University of Honduras, was “violently detained without a warrant for his arrest by members of the Direccion Nacional de Investigacion and G-2 of the Armed Forces of Honduras.”31 He was
subsequently “accused of alleged political crimes and subjected to
harsh interrogation and cruel torture,” but the police and security
forces denied his detention.32
Upon the submission of the case to the Court, the Honduran
government communicated several objections to the Commission’s
26. See id. at 100.
27. See id.
28. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 1 (1994).
29. See id. para. 10 (expressing the concerns of the Honduran Government communicated
in its note to the Court dated March 13, 1997).
30. This is extremely important because the Convention itself does not explicitly state that
the crime of forced disappearance is a violation of the Convention. Yet, the crime of forced
disappearance is one that was perfected to a level of horrific proportion throughout Latin
America.
31. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra note 28, para. 15.
32. Id. These allegations of detention and disappearance were presumed true by the
Commission after the Honduran government repeatedly ignored repeated requests for more
information. See id. para. 19.1.
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procedural handling of the case,33 one of which was the complaint
that the Commission “ignored” the friendly settlement provision.34
The Honduran government argued that the provision in Article
48(1)(f) is mandatory and that the discretionary power granted in Article 45 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Regulations)35 is inapplicable because it contradicts
the Convention.36 The government’s objection to the Regulations
stemmed from the fact that Article 45 gives the Commission discretion over whether “to offer itself as an organ of conciliation”37 when
the “case, by its very nature, is not susceptible to a friendly settlement.”38 The government further argued that the failure to attempt a
friendly settlement made the application inadmissible under Article
61(2)39 of the Convention, which establishes that before the Court can
hear a case, the friendly settlement procedures in Articles 49 and 50
must be exhausted.40 The Commission, on the other hand, “argued
that the friendly settlement procedure is not mandatory and that the
special circumstances of this case made it impossible to pursue such a
settlement.”41 The Commission based this conclusion on three reasons: (1) the Honduran government’s lack of cooperation; (2) the
Government’s refusal to accept responsibility; and (3) the Commission’s finding that the right to life, humane treatment, and personal
liberty “cannot be effectively restored by conciliation.”42
The Court’s response to these arguments was rather puzzling in
that it acknowledged the obligatory nature of the language of Article
48(1)(f), yet declared that the context of the Convention calls for the
maintenance of the Commission’s discretion.43 The Court only limited the Commission’s discretion by stating that it is not to be exercised “arbitrarily.”44 Essentially, the Court’s decision stands in

33. See id. para. 25(1-7).
34. Id. para. 25.5.
35. See Regulations, supra note 15, art. 45(7).
36. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra note 28, para. 42.
37. Regulations, supra note 15, art. 45(2).
38. Id. art. 45(7).
39. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 61(2). “In order for the Court to hear a
case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 to 50 shall have been exhausted.” Id.
40. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra note 28, para. 25.
41. Id. para. 43.
42. Id.
43. See id. para. 44.
44. See id. para. 45.
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agreement with the Commission’s finding that in a charge of
“disappearance,” a denial by the State will make it very difficult to
reach a settlement that sufficiently promotes the human rights protected in the Convention.45 The Court balances the two goals of
seeking an amicable solution46 and promoting human rights by giving
the Commission the ability to assess “the circumstances of each
case . . . , the nature of the rights affected, the characteristics of the
acts denounced, and the willingness of the government to cooperate
in the investigation and to take the necessary steps to resolve it.”47
However, the Commission’s discretionary power to preclude the
possibility of friendly settlement was not left unchallenged. The
mandatory language of Article 48(1)(f) again was used against the
Commission’s policy in the 1994 case, Caballero Delgado and San48
tana. Here, the Court was not as sympathetic to the Commission’s
appraisal of the procedure’s propriety. The distinction is important,
because Caballero Delgado again involved allegations of forced disappearance, but unlike the Honduran government in Velásquez Ro49
dríguez, the Colombian government undertook an investigation.
Upon submission to the Court’s jurisdiction, the Colombian government presented preliminary objections again based on the failure
of the Commission to initiate friendly settlement proceedings.50 The
Government objected to the Commission’s failure because (1) it is
arbitrary for the Commission simply to state that the facts of the case
are, by their nature, not subject to friendly resolution; and (2) that
the Commission should undertake the procedure on its own initiative.51 In addition, the Colombian government stressed that it, unlike
the Honduran government in Velásquez Rodríguez, had never denied
the occurrence of the facts.52
On the first point, the Court concurred with the Colombian government. Velásquez Rodríguez clearly states that the Commission’s

45. See id. para. 46.
46. See id. para. 58.
47. Id. para. 60.
48. See Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 17 (1994).
49. See id. para. 13. According to the petition, Isidro Caballero-Delgado and María del
Carmen Santana were detained on February 7, 1989 by the Colombian Army and despite witnesses to their detention, the Colombian Government denied their detention. See id. paras. 10
& 13.
50. See id. para. 19.
51. See id. para. 20.
52. See id. para. 22.
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discretionary powers are to be, in no way, arbitrary.53 The Commission may only omit the procedure in exceptional circumstances and
for substantive reasons.54 Therefore, the Commission’s cursory
statement about the “nature” of the case was insufficient to justify its
use of discretion.55 In contrast, the Court found that the Commission
was obligated to initiate the proceedings provided that the Government could have freely proposed it.56 The implication of this decision
is that (1) the Commission must explicitly offer reasons for rejecting
friendly settlement and (2) the mere existence of the allegation of
forced disappearance is an insufficient basis for concluding that the
mediation procedure is inappropriate.
In the wake of Caballero Delgado, the Commission now asks the
parties in every case if they have an interest in using the friendly settlement provisions.57 This means that the discretion to use the procedure is in the hands of the parties.58 Now, the parties have the sole
discretion to accept or reject the initiation of this procedure. If one
or both reject it, the friendly settlement procedure will not be used.59
2. The Case of Argentina: The Successful Use of the Friendly
The previous section surveyed the
Settlement Provision.
Commission’s concerns regarding its mediating function. However,
there have been several cases where parties have successfully
resolved their dispute using the friendly settlement procedure.60 Most
helpful to this discussion are recent cases involving the Argentine
government, which are frequently referred to as representative of a
successful friendly settlement.61 In these cases, the complaints
originated from the arbitrary arrest and detention of the petitioners.
The issue actually before the Commission, however, was whether the
Argentine government had failed “to provide effective judicial
remedies to victims of human rights violations.”62 Upon submission,

53. See id. para. 27.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. para. 30.
57. See Cerna, supra note 14, at 102.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Report No. 1/93, Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure in Cases 10.288,
10.310, 10.436, 10.496, 10.631, and 10.771, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, OEA/ser. L/V/II.83, doc. 14
corr. 1 (1993) (Annual Report 1992-1993).
61. See Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure, supra note 60.
62. Id. sec. I, para. 4; see also American Convention, supra note 5, art. 25.
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the petitioners requested that the Commission place itself at the
disposal of the parties.63 The Argentine government agreed to submit
to the friendly settlement procedure and conveyed a genuine
sympathy towards the victims; a sympathy evidenced through a
reference to Argentine President Carlos Menem’s own detention and
desire to adequately compensate them.64
The negotiations concluded with a commitment by the Argentine government to pass a congressional bill to provide for the payment of compensation to the petitioners. 65 Thus, subsequent to the
occurrence of several hearings in which the Commission monitored
the Government’s progress and the actual payment of the petitioners,66 the Commission thanked the parties and closed the case.67
The difficulty with this report of successful settlement is its required brevity. It reveals little of the negotiation/mediation process
and leaves many questions as to the methods used to reach this
agreement. Although, the remainder of this note will be limited in
the depth of its analysis, it should not severely undermine the discussion of the general value of mediation as a tool in situations involving
human rights violations.
III. IS MEDIATION REALLY A “FRIENDLY” SOLUTION IN
THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES?
The friendly settlement mechanism described above raises several normative and procedural questions about its propriety and/or
efficacy. First, and most importantly, the nature of the dispute and
the identity of the parties involved create a power imbalance that
may make the use of mediation in the international human rights
arena inappropriate and even destructive to the promotion of human
rights. Secondly, there are a number of procedural characteristics of
the model that also raise red flags. The most obvious procedural
concern is the dual role of the Commission. The Commission is not
simply the neutral, disinterested facilitator, for if negotiations break
down, the Commission will act as prosecutor—recommending referral to the Court and publishing its own findings and recommendations. Another procedural question is the manner in which the parties enter the mediation process. Because the Commission has
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Report on Friendly Settlement Procedures, supra note 60, sec. II, para. 2.
See id. sec. II, para. 2.
See id. sec. II, para. 3.
See id. sec. III, para. 1.
See id. sec. III, paras. 5 & 6.
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largely been stripped of its discretionary role, a question exists as to
whether there is a sufficient mechanism in place to screen the types
of cases that will be mediated. The last area of evaluation is a bit
more normative and it explores the efficacy of the friendly settlement
mechanism in relation to both the individual petitioner and to society
as a whole. The question arising in both contexts is whether this
model adequately safeguards the rights protected by the American
Convention and the goals of international human rights law.
The issues raised by the use of mediation in the context of international human rights law have been extensively explored in the domestic arena in the United States. In the United States, there has
been an increasing use of mediation to settle family disputes such as
divorce and child custody hearings, which has also meant that issues
of domestic violence often enter the process. Faced with the complexities that a history of abuse brings to a relationship, there has
been a great deal of criticism over whether the mediation model is
appropriate. After all, as the Commission stated in its arguments in
Velásquez Rodríguez, some disputes simply cannot be resolved
through conciliation.68 Throughout the analysis below, the work of
scholars and practitioners regarding the use of mediation in situations
of domestic violence will be used to bring greater insight to the effects of violence on the relationship between the parties and the mediation process itself.
A. The Imbalance of Power Created by the Nature of the Dispute
and the Identity of the Parties
The most important concern arising from the domestic violence
debate is the power imbalance created by the history and relationship
of violence.69 There is wide recognition that the power imbalance
created and maintained through violence does not dissipate at the
negotiating table.70 Simply because the two parties are seated across
from one another does not mean that the power relationship has

68. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra note 28, para. 43.
69. See Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence: Is it the Light at the End of the Tunnel or is it a Train on the Track?, 70 N.D. L.
Rev. 255, 263 (1994); see also Colleen N. Kotyk, Tearing Down the House: Weakening the
Foundation of Divorce Mediation Brick by Brick, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 277, 287
(1997); Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence
Cases Should Not be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855, 861 (1985).
70. See Rowe, supra note 69.
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changed; the presence of fear makes the mediation process unsuitable for friendly settlement.71
This same pattern of violence and domination is often present in
situations of human rights abuses, where the allegations are of systematic abuse extending beyond the victimization of one individual.
The violence inflicted extends to family, friends, children, and the
countless thousands who stand under the suspicion of a government
capable of uncontrolled repression. The disputes settled here literally revolve around life and death matters. Although the dispute can
arise from alleged violations of any of the American Convention’s
enumerated rights, there is a strong possibility that the nature of the
dispute involves violence, torture, murder, illegal detention, or forced
disappearance, and an equally strong possibility that the fear, distrust, and subordination created by this pattern of violence will continue to exist in the “friendly settlement” proceeding.
However, there is a possibility that the balance of power between parties can be maintained through the presence of the mediator.72 If the mediator is well-trained and sensitive to the power dynamic at the table, he or she can respond in a manner that permits
only equal exchange.73 This argument especially may be true in the
friendly settlement procedure, because the Commission is composed
of highly trained human rights specialists who clearly understand the
tools used by abusive governments.74 The presence of the Commission and the political and moral force it carries in the Inter-American
system may comfort the victim and cause the abusing state to think
carefully about its tactics and positions. Although this point will be
discussed more fully later, it is also important to consider that the
state is aware that the Commission is not simply a mediator. If the
friendly settlement procedure fails, the Commission will be in a position to refer the case to the Court or to publish its own findings and
recommendations. This dual role of the Commission may be crucial
in balancing the power relationship.
Despite the presence of a well-trained mediator, there are still
limitations as to what can be achieved in equalizing the power relationship. In the domestic violence arena, one limitation is that the

71. See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 69, at 267-68.
72. See id. at 266-67.
73. See id.
74. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 34. “The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights shall be composed of seven members, who shall be persons of high moral character and recognised competence in the field of human rights.” Id.
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relationship between a victim and an abuser is one often characterized by subtlety.75 The history of abuse creates a situation in which a
victim knows every weapon that the abuser is capable of using—even
a small gesture can have enormous implications.76 Thus, the remaining question is whether even a well-trained mediator can control this
type of pressure.
The power imbalance created by the nature of the dispute alone
should raise sufficient hesitation in using the mediation model, because it is only increased by the identity of the parties. Typically, in
the international arena, the parties in mediation are two states each
carrying the power of sovereignty and national resources. Under the
American Convention, most of the petitioners will be individual citizens or groups of citizens.77 Therefore, the issue is whether the individual has the power to make demands to force a solution that brings
justice. The identity of the parties, in itself, immediately suggests
that the individual has little to “offer” at the negotiating table. It appears to be a gap that even the mediator’s presence may not be able
to bridge.78
The power imbalance arising from the position of the parties can
be lessened by international human rights laws and the growing intolerance of human rights violations by the international community.
The weight of international condemnation stands firmly behind the
victims of human rights abuse. This support gives the individual a
political and moral force the offending state cannot ignore. In addition, in this new era of democratization, it is more likely than not that
the government representatives in the negotiation are not from the
abusing regime. As was seen in the Argentine friendly settlement,
there was a democratically elected government at the table openly

75. See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 69, at 266-67.
76. See id.; see also Kotyk, supra note 69, at 279. “Mediation advocates assert that mediation in the domestic violence context is ‘potentially unsafe and inherently unfair.’ Victims argue that the ‘dynamics endemic to an abusive relationship preclude the possibility of collaborative decision making, even with a skilled mediator.’” Id.
77. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 44. State Parties are not listed among
those able of filing petition with the Commission. Only individuals, groups of individuals, or
non-governmental entities legally recognized by the States Parties may file.
78. In the domestic violence arena, Paul Wahrhaftig comments that when such an imbalance exists “a mutually acceptable solution tends to be one in which the less powerful tolerates
a less satisfactory solution since the mediator cannot impose an unfavorable decision on the
more powerful party.” Rowe, supra note 69, at 861. This comment relates to the specific
problems involved in forcing a state to bend to the demands of the individual. Although the
Commission can publish its findings and recommendations, technically, the Commission has no
real power to impose a decision unfavorable to the State.
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committed to justice and reconciliation—breaking with the abuses of
the “dirty war.” These two factors alleviate much of the concern over
the imbalance of power and the continuation of the abusive relationship at the bargaining table.
B. Procedural Shortcomings of the Friendly Settlement Mechanism
1. The Dual Role of the Commission. The role of the mediator
in negotiations is not one that is automatically accepted or trusted.
In fact, the involvement of a third party often creates apprehension.79
However, an effective mediator can facilitate increased
communication, organizational clarity, and serve as bridge that the
parties can cross to reach mutual understanding. It is generally
agreed that in addition to the benefits of training, the mediator
achieves these functions in his or her role as a neutral, disinterested
third party committed to confidentiality.80 These characteristics are
considered necessary for the mediator to establish a trust with the
parties that will facilitate an atmosphere of full disclosure and honest
exchange.81
With the above ideals in mind, the friendly settlement procedure
of the American Convention raises questions as to the propriety of
using the Commission as both mediator and would-be prosecutor.
The Commission carries a dual mandate to investigate and issue reports and to make available its good offices. The Commission is not
a neutral, disinterested third party, and if a settlement is not reached,
the Commission will either refer the case to the Court’s jurisdiction
and/or publish its own recommendations and findings on the merits.82
This duality destroys the delicate nature of the traditional role of the
mediator. As recognized by Gary W. Paquin, “getting parties to disclose their motivations and feelings about the dispute [is] difficult
enough . . . and informing the parties that such information could be
used in court would destroy any trust that might develop.”83 Consequently, the Commission’s dual role may undermine the entire process. Absent genuine good faith and full acceptance of responsibility,

79. See Richard B. Bilder, When Neighbors Quarrel: Canada-U.S. Dispute Settlement Experience, 33, 34 (Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper No. 8:4, 1987).
80. See Gary W. Paquin, The Development and Organization of Domestic Relations Mediation in a Multi-Function Mediation Center in Kentucky, 81 KY. L.J. 1133, 1135 (1993).
81. See id. at 1137.
82. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 51.
83. Paquin, supra note 80.
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neither side may feel comfortable to come forward with a full disclosure of the truth (an end deemed vitally important in the resolution
of human rights abuses.)84
2. Limitations on the Commission’s Discretion to Screen Cases
Submitted for Friendly Settlement. Another important procedural
characteristic of mediation is that it is, ideally, voluntary in nature;
the parties mutually agree that they both have a legitimate interest in
resolving the dispute through mediation.85 This is an ideal the InterAmerican system has attempted to maintain, as demonstrated by the
Court’s rejection of the argument that the friendly settlement
procedure must always be exhausted.86 Although the Court stripped
the Commission’s absolute discretion, it did leave the parties the
choice of whether to avail themselves of the Commission’s good
offices. As noted above, the Commission formally offers its services
to the parties in every case, but if either party rejects the offer, the
matter is closed until requested at a later time in the proceeding.87
The remaining question in the process of initiating the procedure
is whether voluntary participation is a sufficient screening method to
insure the rejection of a case that is inappropriate for mediation.
Prior to the Court’s ruling in Caballero Delgado that the Commission
must offer its good offices, the Commission made its own evaluation
as to the propriety of mediation on a case-by-case basis. Now, the
Commission’s screening power has been severely limited because it
must offer substantive reasons for a rejection of the friendly settlement procedure. The Commission’s limited authority has not, as of
yet, been sufficiently tested due to the small number of cases that
have used this procedure. Perhaps this is a sign that the voluntary nature of the process is sufficient.
C. Does the Friendly Settlement Mechanism Further the Principles
of International Human Rights Law?
In dealing with the aftermath of gross human rights violations,
the international community seems to stand at the divide between the
principles of justice and the complexities of the socio-political reality.

84. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 4, para. 177 (1988).
85. See Knowlton & Mulhauser, supra note 69, at 260; see also Kotyk, supra note 69, at
277-78.
86. See Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, supra note 48, para. 30.
87. See Regulations, supra note 15, art 45(7).
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At one end of the spectrum there is a philosophy of strict adherence
to the letter of the law, which usually means prosecution or extradition. This purely retributive approach to the resolution of human
rights violations often proves to be a political impossibility which, in
the end, may only exacerbate the conditions of injustice. The other
end of the spectrum comes from a more utilitarian perspective which
simply calls for blanket amnesties—to forgive and forget in the name
of political stability. The powerful forces working on both of these
positions have led the Inter-American system to tread carefully down
the middle road that attempts to remain faithful to the rule of law
while remaining cognizant of the political impediments and the need
for reconciliation.
Article 1(1) of the American Convention imposes affirmative
obligations upon the States Parties “to respect” and “to ensure” the
rights protected by the Convention.88 The Inter-American Court has
interpreted this affirmative duty to include the duty to “prevent, investigate, and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention and . . . to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted.”89 The Court’s interpretation of the duty to ensure the protection of human rights also outlines the growing international commitment to reveal the truth of past abuses committed by
the State Party.90 Under international law, the right of victims to
know the truth about who abused them and why, and the right of the
victims’ families to know the whereabouts and fate of missing loved
ones has become paramount in the effort to bring both justice and
reconciliation to society.91 It is seen as a necessary step in providing
the victim with an effective remedy92 and more importantly, with a
sense of healing. The obligation to “ensure” the protection of human
rights is not only a duty to the individual victim, but it is also a duty
to society as a whole.93 This broader duty is evidenced by the rising
88. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1). “The States Parties to this Convention
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognised herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any
discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” Id. (emphasis
added).
89. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra note 84, at para. 166.
90. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 321, 323-24
(1994).
91. See id. at 331-32.
92. See id. at 332.
93. See id. at 330.
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call for the naming of names, the punishment of perpetrators, and the
government’s public acceptance of responsibility.94 Revealing the
whole truth about the horrific events of the past is seen as an essential step in the continuing struggle to establish the rule of law and to
prevent the occurrence of collective amnesia.95 In the words of the
Inter-American Commission, “Every society has the inalienable right
to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order
to prevent repetition of such acts in the future.”96
The existence of this dual mandate means that the success of the
friendly settlement mechanism depends upon its ability to ensure the
rights of both the individual and society as a whole. The following
analysis will demonstrate that this model of individual versus state
mediation brings a sense of empowerment that allows the individual
victim to direct the outcome of the proceedings and to meet his or
her abuser face-to-face. The model offers an opportunity for the victim to break the silence of oppression by providing a forum where his
or her own voice can be heard. It serves as a chance to regain a sense
of identity that has been stripped away by the abusing state. The discussion that follows will also demonstrate that the friendly settlement
mechanism falls short when the rights of society as a whole are considered. The required confidentiality of the friendly settlement
agreement and the limited scope of the settlement only to those victims before the Commission do not seem to fulfill the societal right to
know the truth of what occurred during the violence and oppression.
1. Empowering the Individual. From the perspective of the
individual petitioners, the friendly settlement procedure may have
provided an effective end to the legal and moral battle they had been
fighting with the Argentine government since the years of the Dirty
War. After nearly a decade of fighting to gain legal recognition of
the crimes committed against them by the military junta, the
petitioners successfully negotiated a settlement agreement. The final
report of the Friendly Settlement Procedure in the Argentine cases
reveals that the Commission granted the parties a hearing where,
after listening to the petitioners, the Argentine government
expressed that it “did not necessarily disagree” with the petitioners
94. See id.
95. See id. at 331.
96. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1985-86, OEA/Ser.
L/V./II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 191, 192-93 (1986).
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and that President Menem wanted to give them “adequate
compensation.”97 The settlement eventually agreed upon by the
parties came under Decree 70/91 enacted by the Argentine Congress
on January 10, 1991,98 which was adopted for the specific purpose of
monetarily compensating the petitioners.99 It authorized the payment
of compensation to requesting persons “who proved that they had
been detained by executive order during the military government.”100
On a concrete level, the benefit to the individual petitioners rises
from the monetary settlement they succeeded in getting from the Argentine government. The fact that this was authorized by a congressional decree provided a sense of public recognition of the government’s wrongdoing; the government accepted responsibility for its
actions. However, the mere transfer of funds is often seen as an inadequate remedy for the suffering inflicted by years of pain and terror; this could not be more true than in a situation of systematic
abuse. Money, although it is seen as an acknowledgement of wrongdoing, it does not close wounds nor does it bring back a sense of dignity and respect to the individual. Therefore, something more cathartic is needed the silence of oppression must be broken. The
Inter-American Commission’s friendly settlement mechanism gives
the individual the opportunity to attain a broader sense of healing
than that achieved by monetary compensation. The mediation model
provides the victim a chance to be heard and actually to control the
outcome of its relationship with the state.
In the human rights arena, prosecution is often seen as the only
avenue toward justice, but the definition of justice is not static. By its
very nature, the definition of justice differs for every individual,101 and
the friendly settlement mechanism gives the individual an opportunity to achieve his or her own sense of what justice looks like. Sitting
down at the bargaining table with the government of a state gives the
individual an unprecedented level of power on the international
level. It allows the individual direct involvement in the final resolution of the dispute rather than waiting for the outcome of a trial that
may never occur. Recognizing the importance of the individual on an



97. Report on Friendly Settlement Procedures, supra note 60, sec. 2, para.1.
98. See id. sec. 2, para. 3. On December 23, 1991, this decree was confirmed by National
Law 24043. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. Subsequent decrees allowed compensation to petitioners not detained by executive
order and to those whose arrest by the executive branch had been upheld by the courts. See id.
101. See Mike Perry, Beyond Dispute: A Comment on ADR and Human-Rights Adjudication, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 50, 53-54 (1998).
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international level brings a sense of empowerment to the victim. The
process itself tells the individual that his or her interests are of value
and are not subordinate to the interests of the state but rather, that
they are equal. This, in itself, encourages a fundamental respect for
the human dignity of the individual. The friendly settlement procedure sends the message to state governments that, in the end, they
will always have to answer to the needs of their citizens, and if they
do not, they will be held accountable not only to the international
community but to the individual as well. Deeply connected to this
sense of empowerment is the gift of voice provided by the friendly
settlement mechanism. The mediation model allows the victim to
narrate his or her own story in a face-to-face confrontation with the
abusing state. Although the government representatives sitting at the
table are not the individual perpetrators, they represent the source of
the victim’s suffering. The international forum forces the government
to recognize the value of those it has victimized, and perhaps allows
victims to hear the apology for which they have been waiting.
In addition to emotional empowerment, the friendly settlement
mechanism also provides the individual with his or her only opportunity at legal recognition on an international level. Although the Inter-American Court almost always allows the individual petitioner to
appear before it to tell his or her story, the individual does not have
the power to bring the case before the Court.102 The individual must
depend upon the Commission or the state itself to refer the case to
the Court’s contentious jurisdiction.103 Due to the fact that the InterAmerican Court has been asked to exercise its contentious jurisdiction only ten times in the twenty years it has been in existence,104 the
friendly settlement mechanism may be the best opportunity for the
individual to state his or her interests. In addition, bringing the state
into a non-adversarial atmosphere and allowing it to participate
brings a greater likelihood that the measures agreed upon will actually be put into action.
Instead of receiving a list of
“recommendations” from the Commission, which the State Party is
not required to implement, the state voluntarily agrees to a plan of
action with which it can live.
Despite the optimism regarding the benefits that the friendly settlement mechanism provides for the individual victim, there is a
102. See American Convention, supra note 5, art. 51.
103. See id.
104. See Contentious Cases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (visited Jan. 22,
1999) <http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/iachr/contntus.htm>.

STANDAERT_2.DOC

538

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

09/09/99 9:40 AM

[Vol 9:519

cause for concern in the fact that the report of the settlement agreement contains no evidence that the Argentine government either investigated the abuse endured by the petitioners or identified and
punished the perpetrators. The language of Decree 70/91 even suggests that it was the petitioner’s burden to prove that they had been
detained and thus were entitled to compensation. How is this acceptable in light of the Velásquez Rodríguez ruling that imposes an
affirmative duty upon the state to investigate? The settlement is also
troubling in that it does not provide for the punishment of those responsible for the detainment and abuse suffered by the petitioners.
There was no naming of names, no acknowledgement of the events
surrounding the detainment, nor even any explanation for why they
were abused. The government’s failure to investigate is a clear violation of the individual’s right to know the truth about those responsible for his or her suffering and the state’s duty to investigate.
Although the missing layers of the settlement agreement are incredibly damaging to friendly settlement’s ability to enforce the affirmative obligations imposed by the American Convention, they can
be countered by one mitigating factor that may explain or at least dissuade some of the apprehension the absence may have created. It is
important to remember that the issue in this case was narrowed to a
procedural denial of a fair trial by the Argentine government in the
years after the fall of the military regime. To avoid the statute of
limitations arguments made by the Argentine government, the petitioners did not raise issues as to the unlawful arrests and physical injuries; instead, they simply protested the dismissal of their cases by
the Argentine Supreme Court.105 Thus, technically, the Argentine
government had no perpetrators to punish and no investigation to
undertake.
Despite all of the concerns and all of the unanswered questions
that the Argentine cases have left, the friendly settlement mechanism
provides an unprecedented opportunity for the individual to vindicate his or her rights under international human rights law. First, it is
a momentous occasion when the individual is given the opportunity
to stand in front of the government that once victimized him or her in
order to be heard, recognized, and compensated. Although the report does not reveal the substance of the conversations at the negotiating table, it can only be hoped that the petitioners were allowed this
small chance of satisfaction. The second bit of comfort in this process

105. See Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure, supra note 60, sec. 1, para. 8.
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stems from the fact that both the individual and the Commission still
have the right to reject any settlement offer that does not comply
with the ideals set forth in the Convention.106 The individual retains
the power to walk out of the negotiations and to reject any settlement
he or she finds unjust; the Commission, through its continuing power
of discretion, may terminate its role as an organ for conciliation when
there is an absence of good will in reaching a settlement that respects
the rights set forth in the Convention.107
2. Undermining Society’s Right to Know the Truth. The above
discussion has centered on the benefits that the friendly settlement
mechanism offers the individual victim, but it is also necessary to
evaluate the proceedings from a broader societal standpoint. While
the absence of an investigation may be tolerable to the individual
victim looking to find some sense of resolution to a decades-long
battle against injustice, is this acceptable from a societal standpoint?
Within the international community, there is a growing recognition of
the need to reveal the truth about the past.108 This recognition is
evidenced by the number of transitional governments that have
formed either truth commissions or who have at least issued official
historical reports. Therefore, knowing the truth about abuse and
repression is not simply the right of the individual. It is essential to
larger societal healing that must occur in order to achieve a true
sense of reconciliation, respect for the sanctity of life, and
commitment to the rule of law. Therefore, the Argentine settlement,
which did not require a thorough government investigation, denied
the societal right to know the extent and nature of the government’s
involvement in the infringement of the petitioners’ rights.
This denial of the societal right to know the truth is further undermined by the confidential nature of the friendly settlement proceedings. Even if the government did agree to investigate fully the
petitioners’ allegations, the report would not necessarily disclose the
content of the settlement agreement. The proceedings remain closed
and the Commission’s report is limited to a “brief statement of the
facts and the solution reached.”109 The Commission cannot issue a
more in-depth report on what took place at the negotiating table and
it cannot issue its own findings as to the circumstances of abuse and
106.
107.
108.
109.

See Regulations, supra note 15, art. 45(7).
See id. 15
See Pasqualucci, supra note 90, at 330.
Regulations, supra note 15, art. 45(6).
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the government’s responsibility for those crimes.110 Therefore, while
the friendly settlement agreement allows the individual the power to
demand the truth and to insist upon a settlement that he or she finds
just, the state’s larger citizenry is denied any sort of veto power. The
community must accept whatever agreement is reached.
Perhaps more important than this notion of a societal right to
know the truth, is the sense that negotiating with any person, group,
or state responsible for gross violations of human rights actually condones their actions.111 The question of whether or not we should even
consider the interests of the Hitlers of the world looms large; the preceding discussion has assumed that we should. Is this assumption
correct if the true aim of international human rights law is to instill a
respect for the rights of all individuals and for the rule of law? The
answer to this question is not an easy one and would require much
more thought than this Note is meant to cover. Yet, the concern created by bringing the abusing party to the negotiating table rather
than to a court of law, can be overcome by the strength of commitment that both the Inter-American Commission and the individual
petitioners display in enforcing a state’s obligation to ensure the protection of human rights. The Commission retains the discretion to
deny the settlement option when it finds either the nature of the case
inappropriate or the state’s lack of good faith.112 This screening process will exclude the perpetrator or abusing state that lacks a true
commitment to the ideals of the American Convention; in fact, it will
only allow the transitional government committed to breaking with
the past to sit down at the negotiating table. The friendly settlement
mechanism is thus not a procedure that allows the murderer to negotiate his or her fate with the victim’s family, but rather it is a procedure that allows successor governments that are committed to change
the opportunity to share interests and to participate in the rebuilding
of a nation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrates that the use of the mediation
model in the resolution of situations involving human rights abuses
may not always be “friendly.” While the use of mediation in the international arena may be appropriate in encouraging more coopera-

110. See id.
111. See Perry, supra note 101, at 57.
112. See Regulations, supra note 15, art. 45(7).
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tive relations between nations, it may not hold such promise in disputes arising from histories of systematic abuse and terror. Assuming
that mediation is theoretically appropriate for the resolution of these
disputes, this analysis reveals three main procedural concerns that
arise in its implementation under the American Convention. First,
the imbalance of power created by both the history of violence and
the complainant’s individual status are a substantial cause of concern
in the use of mediation. Second, the dual role of the Commission, as
both mediator and prosecutor, may serve to undermine the trust and
confidence of the parties, which are usually considered essential to
facilitating an open and honest exchange of information. The third
concern is that the Commission, in its role as mediator, has been
stripped of its absolute discretion in whether to allow the parties to
use its good offices. This raises questions as to whether the Commission’s remaining discretion and the voluntary participation of the parties are sufficient screening mechanisms to determine when the nature of the dispute is not susceptible to conciliation.
The next level of concern speaks to a more overriding question
about the general propriety of the mediation model. Even if the
above procedural concerns were absent, are the friendly settlement
procedures capable of producing a satisfactory result in light of the
goals of international human rights law? The analysis of the final settlement agreement in the Argentine cases suggests that the procedures may provide a window of opportunity for offending states to
escape some of the harsher obligations imposed by the American
Convention. In addition, there are concerns about the propriety of
even allowing human rights violators the opportunity to make
amends, to make a deal with the victims, and to escape the possibility
of prosecution and punishment. Without clear standards as to what
type of dispute is unsuitable for mediation, where should institutions
such as the Commission draw the line?
Despite the above concerns, the mediation model should not be
completely rejected as an option in this complex area of violence and
abuse. As societies attempt to rebuild in the aftermath of violence
and oppression and consolidate a genuine respect for human rights
and the rule of law, there is more to consider than blindly complying
with the purist ideals of punishment. There is an urgent cry for creative solutions that simultaneously address the past and move into the
future. The mediation model, facilitated by such well-trained institutional bodies as the Commission and coupled with the moral force of
the principles of international law, may prove to be the solution the
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world is seeking. It is a forum where the victim has a voice and the
offending government is asked to come to terms with its responsibilities. Mediation is not a perfect solution but perhaps it can provide
the same sense of self-empowerment among the parties that it has
done in the domestic arena. Instead of working against each other to
rebuild war torn societies, human rights activists and struggling nations can sit down together to formulate a mutually beneficial plan.
Patricia E. Standaert

